Simulation modeling currently enjoys great popularity as a tool for solving problems within Department of Defense activities.
INTRODUCTION
Emerging computer environment standards and technology, as well as software design improvements, have produced an unprecedented opportunist y to improve existing models used in support of military analysis.
The model enhancements selected for implementation come from a set of initiatives generated by the developer/user community. Although the designers, developers, and users of simulation models are sophistical ed technologists and decision scientists, the model improvements they select are usually chosen in an entirely unscientific way.
In this work, we present a fledgling methodology proposed for determining which aspects of a given model should be chosen for improvement, and discuss the implementation of this method using examples from experiences in model development.
Emerging technologies in the computer science realm have produced an opportunist y to change model fidelity expediently.
Simulation modeling software using the object-oriented programming paradigm has existed for decades, see Bertwistle (1973) , but objectoriented models have a reputation for being poor performers.
A diversity of products have now become available which combine modern soft ware production environments, object-oriented simulation (00 S), and performance competitive with FORTRAN models.
The relevance of this 00S revolution to the present discussion is that object-oriented models are forced to be modular, so that exchanging an existing submodel with an enhanced one does not carry the cost it used to. Thus, growth of simulation models from primative to sophisticated is more graceful, costs less, and does not rely on personnel possessing extreme intimacy with the model's implement ation. Thus, progressive upgrades of existing models are both feasible and necessary. Which submodels to improve is a choice we will face more often, and one we should deal with scientifically.
FIDELITY
In this section, we attach some formality to the notion of model fidelity.
Some underlying assumptions concerning the nature of the level of fidelity problem will be presented so that the subsequent mathematical formulation is understood.
Definitions
Model level of fidelit y refers to the degree to which the model produces the same out comes as the tangible, physical system. Thus, a policy constructed with the aid of a model with infinite fidelity would be identical to a policy produced using unlimited experimentation with the real system. Model validation (as we define it) is the practice of comparing the model to the physical system and concluding that the model produces out comes similar to the physical system. The hope is that the model output is similar to the physical system to the degree that the model is usable. Model validation is often confounded by several factors: the physical system is not observable because it
does not yet exist, observing it is a hazard to the system or the observer, the agency in control of the system prevents it from being observed, or observation itself causes the system to change its used as a surrogate for fidelity.
Assumptions
The hidden assumption in the approach we take is that model fidelity must not decrease with model resolut ion. Simulation modeling may be thought of as the modeling of the interactions of obj ects and their environment.
As the resolution becomes greater, the logic within an object becomes more environmentally dependent because more of the system is considered environment al to the (smaller) object. Thus, user confidence grows with resolution because more of the physical system is taken into account by the actions of the model's objects.
Is this reasonable? Analysts have often found themselves arguing in the negative, often to the frustration of both themselves and the sponsoring organization.
The sponsor cannot fathom why the analyst insists on ignoring physical realities of the system modeled, while the analyst sees resolution as a source of obfuscation.
The method proposed by the analyst is often much too mathematically sophisticated to be useful for the sponsor. Intercession in this oftenoccuring debate is critical to the future growth of the modeling community.
Example
In Bailey et ai (1992) In what follows, we will assess the costs and benifits of including these three upgrades in MCCAAM, and describe how we can come to a conclusion about the efficacy of making the upgrades. Furthermore, some of the required data is often used to support some judgmental process, such as the probability y that a missle battery acts on a partially jammed tracking solution.
An axiom of model development is that more resolut ion requires more data. Sponsors do a great deal of data collection for the systems they administer, but this data is not usually collected with modeling in mind.
Architecture standards should force all of these data sources to be comparable, so that access to data will not represent much cost. Thus, the risk in data sources is the major cost of using data.
Performance Degradation
Closely associated with the resolution of the supporting data used, poorer performance of the model is seen as a negative impact of model fidelity increase. By scoring the baseline and jammer upgrade models, we find that the data risk score grows by 30Y0.
We made no attempt to determine the sensitivity of the model to the data.
To add radio failure and repair processes to MC-CAAM, we performed similar scoring. Because the frequency-hopping radio is new, and the existing radio is a well-tested workhorse, the failure data had no risk. The repair data was drawn from some expert judgments.
When a radio does fail, its replacement must reenter the radio net vacated by the broken radio. This reentry process was designed by the developers for the frequent y-hoppers.
Failure and repair of radios inflated the data risk score by 7Y0.
To make the perishability y of communication tasks, the data required is the allotted time for each kind of task, drawn from our own judgments, and inflating the risk score by 12~o.
The performance degradation costs can be accessed objectively.
Based on some simple timing experiments, we see that the upgrades slow the baseline model by:
q jammers: 870;
q failure and repair: lYo; q task perishability: 470.
None of these upgrades grossly inflate the turnaround time of the model.
The perishability y upgrade inflates computation much more than expected because it causes MCCAAM to do a good deal of garbage collection.
The addition of jammers in the model meant that we were required to interview some experts on ground-based jamming operations in order to design the jammer objects. We were also compelled to construct a set of library jammer objects with default data, but they must be taylored to the scenario the user constructs.
Thus, we have reduced our potential user population somewhat by making MCCAAM more sophisticated.
The user is not really burdened with any further requirements for expertise for either of the two other upgrades.
Benefits
From the above definitions, we can say that we seek fidelity, yet we would like it to come at the expense of small increases in submodel resolution. How is the benefit of the increase in fidelity manifested? How do we measure it? We might call any such measurement a measure of overall model fidelity,
In this discussion, we will consider the case where the simulation is used in support of making some selection from a set of alternatives, (eg. C41 architectures, ammunition round reliabilities, EA-6 jamming assignments, or submarine tactics). A different approach must be developed for simulations used for training.
Leti=l,2 ,. ... S be the set of feasible alternatives for the selection.
Suppose that we could experiment with the real system aa if it were a simulation model, and that we could sample an unlimited number of replications. Let pj be the relative frequency of the event that sj is the best of the S selections. Depending on the underpinning of the reader's philosophical framework of probability y and optimization, pj could be seen as the probability that selection Sj is the op- where we use~u (sj ) as our estimate of pj. Under the assumption that the upgrade makes no difference in the selection process, we know Xu -x~_ 1, see Agresti (1990) . We can construct
If we assume (unreasonably) that the upgrades' effects are mutually independent, BK is the sum of independent x~_~random variables, so BKXfrcl(s_l).
Trading Cost and Benefit
The costs and benefits elucidated above suggest several ways to proceed. Suppose that we q restrict total data risk score to R; Q restrict performance degradation to D;
q insist that no upgrade demands more knowledge of the developers or users than they can be expected to attain in a short time.
If we let Rb be the data risk involved with the baseline system, and Db be the run time of the current system, we could proceed as described below q start with baseline = existing system, Rb = 100%, Db = 100%, and all upgrades under considerate ion. 
